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Reflections on Childhood
and Change
by
Patricia F. Carini

''When we
split the atom,
everything
changed-except
our ways of
thinking."

•,

\

I am going to open these reflections on childhood
and change by identifying what I believe to be a central--maybe the central--task confronting us as the
20th century enters its final decades. I am going to
do that by referring to an insight provided by the
thinker whose thought and works may fairly be said to
have had the most dramatic i mpact on our particular
lives a nd times--! refer, of course, to Albert Einstein,
the theory of relativity and the splitting of the atom.
The insight offered by him in response to his own
work, and to which I refer, is the often quoted statement tha t when we split the atom, everything changed-except our ways of thinking. And that I believe places
our task before us and with some urgency: the need to
change our ways of thinking. I believe that to commence
that ta s k requires that we consider the power of thought
itself to make changes in the actual world, as
Einstein's thought did, and to take seriously the
respons i bilities our capacity for thinking confers upon
us. And further, I believe that we need to explore
what it means that we all do think--and not just some
of us; that is, I am suggesting we need the widest and
most inclusive thought possible about thinking, not as
a specialist study, but as activity in which we are all,
regardl e ss of era, age, or culture, engaged and for
which we are all responsible.
The approach I am going to offer as fruitful for
this reconsideration of thinking--and it is doubtless
only on e among many--is "works." By "works" I mean not
only major or seminal ones like Einstein's or those of
other r e cognized scientists, artists, and philosophers,
but also the more ord i nary kinds of "works"--letters
and diaries, handwork, household constructions--projects
of all kinds done by all kinds of people. In fact, I am
entertaining, and asking you to entertain, as "works"
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anything that bears the imprint of human hand and
mind.
I want to stress, too, that since the purpose of
such a study is to understand thinking as a human
activity, it cannot be undertaken only through the specialized disciplines to which a "work" might ordinarily
be assigned--as Einstein's would be to physics. Rather,
this study must be undertaken by all of us in a common
effort to learn more about ourselves and the workings
of the human mind and consciousness. Here I treat
"works," small or large, as artifacts attesting to the
human impulse to make, to build and to narrate our
lives--from time immemorial to the present moment.
There, I will try through this talk to illustrate,
- how we might approach "works" broadly as the
workings of the human mi nd;
- how works arouse further thoughts and thinking
and, therefore, how thought builds on thought;

''This study must
be undertaken by
all of us m a
common effort to
learn more about
ourselves and the
workings of the
human mind and
.
''
conscwusness.

and most importantly,
- how the access to "works" provides a common
ground from which to re-think together our
powers of thought.
I am going to do this by exploring some "works."
I have alluded to Einstein's only to suggest how his
response to his own works po i nts a direction for our
thought: to re-think thinking. I will explore next in
some detail a small "work" wr i tten by a ten-year-old
girl called (Iris), the parentheses indicating a pseudonym; a poetic dialogue that itself addresses change,
time, and thinki ng. My next step will be to describe
how this "work" prompted me to think of other works;
i n this instance, works of adult poets also addressed
to these same issues. I will conclude, in light of
these considerations, with some thoughts on education. 1
Now to the task. It is not accidental that I
choose first to approach the issue of change and cha nges
in thinking through a child's work. First of all, I
want to be sure that when I later lay out ideas on
thinking and changes in thinking that i t is quite clear
that I am not talking about some specialized intellectual activity which only some people do or understand.
Starting with a piece of writing by a ten-year - old girl
is helpful in this respect.
Then, too, the piece I have chosen, called "The
conversation between Now and Past," is especially apt
4

for our purposes because it brings the ideas of change
and time to bear on events and issues in the real world
that have very real effects on our lives: war and
threat of ultimate destruction. This is useful since I
do want also to talk in actual terms about how our
thinking might change with respect to these threats.
Now I am aware that ( Ir i s') dialogue, and especially the response that I will make to it, does requ i re
further i ntroduction, but I want first to read the piece
aloud, then following that reading I will talk a little
about the writer, the circumstances surrounding the
dialogue's composition, and the approach I will use i n
responding to this work.
(This is the piece.)

The conversation between Now and Past [Era sed and
rewritten to fit on one l i ne]
"Hello , Now," said Past . ("Pa st" was first written
"then"; i t was erased and "Past" was substituted.)
"Hello , Then ," said Now .
"I wish that I had such great inventions like you , "
said Past .
"Well , my People have made something to destroy
both of us . So . .. I wish my People were like your
People . 11
"Well , what is this something .

11

"This something is a nuclear bomb."
"How much power does this bomb have . "
"Enough to blow up half the world and kill what is
left of it and also kill us ."
"How can we stop this . "
"I 'm afraid we can ' t .
"Are you sure .
"Yes .

I am .

11

11

11

"J'ou mean the only wa.y for this to stop is for the
People to not want war ."
"Ye s . "
5

"That 's not f air."
"I know, but there is nothi ng f or us to do ."
"Good- bye . "
"Good- bye ."
Now, while you are mulling that over, I will
describe the writer a l i ttle and say a few words about
the setting in which the piece was written. As mentioned earlier, the writer was ten years old when
wrote this piece. She attends the Prospect Sehr,
North Bennington, Vermont ; a school founded t wf
years ago by severa l li ke-minded persons, i ncl L
Neither the dialogue f orm nor the subject-matte~
ass i gned. However, the pi ece was most probably ~
during a regular ly scheduled writ i ng period. It i.
c
been edited; that i s, the typescript i s faithful t < . ne
form, punctuation, and spelling used by the writer. The
school is for children from all walks of life; ( Iris')
ci rcumstances and her aptitudes are, of course, unique
a s are the circumstances and aptitudes of each of us.
She is not, however, a ccording to some scale of measurement or other external criterion, what is referred to
these days as "gifted"; nor does she, by her teachers'
observations, stand out among her peers. She is, as
the poetic dialogue evidences, a capable person, and a
person capable of thought.
The dialogue came to my attention in the context
of a total collection of ( Iris') writing and art works
that numbers approxi mately 1200 pieces and spans, to
date, six years of her school life. This also is not
unusual in that the school has made a practice of saving any works produced by the children that are not
taken home. As a staff we give attent i on on a regular
basis to individual works a nd collections in order to
better understand ch i ldren's particular interests and
the larger categories of thought to which these interests refer.
Now, in terms of my response to the piece, let me
say f i rst what I won't do. I will not, for example,
attempt to address what (Iris) intended or what she
would say if you asked her what she meant or po i nt to
any external set of experiences which might appear to
explain her choice of subject matter or the context in
which it appears. Neither will I speak of this work as
an extension of her psyche, whether as morbid preoccupation or as the workings of youthful genius. And,
finally, I won't dismiss the thought expressed as not
really being there because a child wrote the piece.
6
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"The child's voice
deserves to be
heard . .. with the
same attentiveness
as we hear an
adult."

Now, I want to extend that last comment a bit. Of
course, like you, I can distinguish a mature work from
a child ' s--or at least, usually I can, and am in general
persuaded that I am able to do so. However, acknowledging that distinction, I am also persuaded that the
child's voice deserves to be heard for the perspective
it offers with the same attentiveness as we hear an
adult; not because the perspectives are wholly coincidental, but precisely because the difference is
instructive.
To offer a brief illustration of that difference,
I would point out that the child, among other things,
has the advantage of a relative freedom from preconceptions and piousness that often strikes to the heart of
the matter; such as the pointed observation that the
emperor has no clothes. Alternatively, the adult, among
other things, has the advantage of knowledge and articulated frameworks of thought that allow the flexible
entertainment of possibilities that can lead to
reasoned and responsible judgments. While acknowledging
that these perspectives are distinguishable, and in
important ways, I want also to stress a larger and prior
condition of our human consciousness which unites them:
We are each and all, child or adult, constrained to make
some sense and order of what we call "life"; here, there
are no exceptions, and in this, if we are attentive, we
are all, regardless of age, status or culture, understandable to each other. But more than that, because
of the differences among us, we have interesting and
instructive things to say to each other.
Therefore, and here I turn to what I will do, my
response to the piece will treat it as a serious work;
that is, a working of the human mind and thus an access
to thought. In a manner of speaking, I will treat the
piece itself as a mind that will, given the attention
of another mind--my own--disclose a few of the thoughts
it is thinking. What I will do in practice is to think
aloud to the dialogue and invite you to entertain my
thoughts in company with its and with your own. In
this way, I hope by a concrete example to illustrate
how importantly and interestingly "works" bring us to
think, individually and collectively. More incidentally,
and largely by allusion, I will refer to a method of
reflection for entering into and describing "works."
However, since that reflective-descriptive process,
which has been developed at the Prospect Center since
about 1974, will be carried out and demonstrated in the
workshops following this talk, I will not attempt to
explicate it in the abstract.
Now, there are many emphases that might be given
in a response to this poetic dialogue--and several
7
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pretty bleak ones. For example, the notion of killing
time--" ... to blow up half the world and kill what is - left of it and also kill us. "--is certainly grim enough.
Contributing to that emphasis, the solution proffered
by Past to this possibility in the form of a question
(but not punctuated as such) is phrased in the negative:
"You mean the way for this to stop is for the People to
not want war."
Continuing in this vein, the solution is prefaced
by Now's assertion that they--Now and Past--are powerless; that is, by implication neither the knowledge
possessed in the immediate present, nor recourse to
memory and history can save the day. In effect, time
has run out. If this line of thought is pursued to the
conclusion of the poem, that is, in a manner of speaki ng, precisely what occurs: Past and Now bid each other
farewell and, like the gods of yore, exit--leaving the
matter at hand to "the People."
That is one emphasis, and it calls attention to
the content and a few of its possible connotations.
There are, of course, other emphases that might be
given. For example, this piece is just what the title
says it i s: a conversation. It is all voice. The
dialogue alternates with precision and clarity between
time personified, but personified as lar ger than life
powers who possess both people and possessions. That
suggestion of separate domains, occupied by Past and
Now as geographic locations or principalities, underscores the indifference to the spatial location in
which this dialogue is taking place. I t could be
occurring anywhere or nowhere.
Staying with its vocal character, t he tone of the
discourse is distinctly conversational, every day,
matter-of-fact--even casual; somewhat akin to the tone
and quality of exchange when acquaintances meet on the
street. There is, for example, to my ear a pleasantly
familiar or informal twist to the greeting: "Hello,
Now"/"Hello, Then." Past commences the exchange, as if
he (or she?) has been noting and mulling over the wonde rs of a time that has passed him by. Past speaks
wi shfully and also admiringly or even enviously of
Now's "great inventions." Now's response is also
wishful, and in part, a disclaimer. While Past attributes the inventions to Now, Now attribut es them to "my
People." Because what the people have now made can
destroy present and past and the world, Now wishes that
"my People" were like Past's People. In spite of that
wish, we are left in no doubt that the power to control
these events has passed irrevocably from the saving
grace of time into the people's hands. Times have
changed--and so has time itself.
8

When Past protests against this change--this irrevocable turning point in
the affairs of time--it is in the idiom of childish protest: "That's not fair."
That is, it's not fair that the rules changed in this game. It's not fair that
I am not treated with the consideration that I deserve or given a voice in this
decision. The child voice echoing through this phrase addressed as it is to
solemn and monumental events over which the child, no more than time itself, has
control, moves me. It also lends validity to the piece by its trueness to the
child's own voice and experience.
But then there are other implications and emphases. There is the formal
and yet musical tempo of the piece that is a function of variation in line
length and inflection with i n lines. In counterpoint to that melodic structure,
there is the unrelenting logic of Now's argument, stated as it is, flatly and
matter-of-factly. Matter-of-factness is underscored by the "mistaken" punctuation of questions so that they read as declarative sentences; a mistake that is
just a trifle surprising in a piece that demonstrates quite a sophisticated
grasp of these conventions. Witness, for example, that ellipsis notation in
line 6.
There is, further, a conciseness to the piece and sense of placement or fit
that is aesthetically pleasing. The style is also spare; adjectives are minimal
and the speakers once introduced speak in their own recognizable voices without
such further conventions of written dialogue as "Past asked," "Now replied ... "
However, emphasis is given to certain words by the use of capitals in other than
conventional places--notably, and consistently, the noun "People."
Then there are choices of words. For example, in the original, as annotated
in the typescript, the opening line was first written as "Hello, Now/Said Then."
To my ear, there is an asymmetrical rightness to the writer's correction which
substitutes Past for Then in this line and so saves the passage from the formality of a perfectly parallel structure. The variation also highlights the
familiar ring of Now and Then, with its connotations of "every once in awhile we
get together or chance to meet on the street and pause for a moment to catch up
on the news."
Interestingly enough, present is never substituted for Now as "then" is on
one occasion for Past. I note that Now is wholely unambiguous and carries a
greater immediacy than Present since it focuses it to this minute--right now.
In a manner of speaking, Now has all the facts, knows ~the answers, holds all
the cards. However, even allowing for the temporal ambiguity of "Then" in its
single appearance, the future is not personified as Past and Now are, nor is it
directly addressed in any other way. It is as if Past and Now have no claim on
it. The only path or way still open, and opening toward the future depends on
"the People." The future is theirs.
Here I return to the negative construction--"for the People to not want
war." It is apt here and more than that: for it is here, in this phrase, that
the piece takes, for me, a strange or unfamiliar turn, and begins to do as the
poet Howard Nemerov suggests that a poem sometimes does, to think deeply. There
is no glib recourse to "wanting peace" with its easy overtones of rest and quiet;
no cute writing about flowers and rainbows. Instead, there is that austere
negative, suggesting an austere discipline: to not want war, to actively not
prefer it. If I were here to fo l low through on the next step that Nemerov
9

suggests for conversing with a poem, we would in fact stop at this point, to
think that phrase--and I stress to think, not about it, but t o think it: tha:-t'""
is, to let the phrase sink in on us11SWe sink in on it in order thatit might
raise up its own images and meanings. I'm not going to do that or elaborate on
it, but only suggest that sometime we might each take say two or three minutes
to try that: to think "for the People to not want war." Here I touch on this
notion briefly to suggest the use of a phrase--this or others--as a divining rod
to mind that reveals it to be quite a lot more than the sum of its analytic
powers.
Now you may with justification chide me for over-reading this piece, and of
hanging heavy philosophical wash on a slender poetic line. Or even, with this
last suggestion, of playing fast and loose with reason. I am mindful of these
dangers. I do want, therefore, to point out that whatever emphases .!!!l'.. responses
have given to the piece and however erroneously, its meaning remains open and
altogether ambiguous, just as the writer's intentions remain mysterious. That it
stirs and evokes not only my interest and intellect but my feelings and imagination is all that is incontrovertible--and in that respect, the work stands on its
own merits: A work, a product of the human imagination that moves other humans.
But let me insist, too, that by the very fact that it evokes my attention and
responses, the piece also invites yours, and that marks it as understandable
among us--not explainable, perhaps, but altogether meaningful: a datum of human
experience, something to think about, discuss and consider. Something then that
provokes thought and mind.
If time and format allowed, we could indeed do together with this piece
what a group of us, in fact, did do--describe it carefully and collectively to
determine the coincidence of meaning it evoked among us and to disclose the patterns of content and structure that lead to and support that coalescence of
meaning. We might even try Nemerov's exercise of thinking that phrase. Given
even more time, we could look at this one piece as it stands in relation to the
body of works, some 1200 pieces, produced by (Iris) since her entry into the
school at age five.
We cannot do that, neither can I take the time to myself place before you
some of the relationships of this piece to the larger body of work, although I
do call your attention to the brief statement of context which appears on the
back of the typescript. Here you will note among other things that while time
and the unknown are recurrent themes, the motif of nuclear war is not frequently
employed in their exploration, nor does it come up with any degree of frequency
in other contexts.
II

Now
dialogue
travels,
thoughts
time not
not want

what I hoped to illustrate by thinking aloud in response to (Iris')
is this: that thought invites thought and so resists isolation; it
and sometimes in unexpected directions. Not surprisingly then, the
being thought in (Iris') piece started in me a train of thought, this
directly related back to it--although that phrase "for the People to
war" continues to haunt me--but leading on from it.

And here I ask your indulgence and company as I pursue the train of thought
it evoked for me. It began with the strong sense that I had read (or seen?) in
some adult work, thoughts or meanings that were remarkably similar. Because what
10
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I was sensing as related is, in fact, a poem I know quite well, Conrad Aiken's
"A Letter from Li Po," a passage from it crossed my mind quite soon after reading (Iris') piece. It was not the specific passage that was being awakened in
my memory by (Iris') writing, but it was close enough to send me back to the
book. There I found not only the passage that was teasing me just beyond mental
reach, but as often happens, others. One of these, one that I had read many
times, speaks as (Iris) does of Past and Now, but here the future, so mi nimally
entertained by her, completes a cycle in which nature's seasons are intertwined
with poetry and music.

The timelessness of time takes foY'171 in rhyme :
the locust and the lotus tree rehearse
a four - foY'171 song, the quatrain of the year :
not in the clock ' s chime only do we hear
the passing into the future of the now :
but in the alteration of the bough
time becomes visible , becomes audible ,
becomes the poem and the music too :
time becomes still , time becomes time , in rhyme .

(1 ; 909)

It seems unthinkable that a cycle so full in its sweep, so encompassing of
our lives and works could be broken. Yet the passage that I was seeking, the
one ( I ri s) reminded me of, thinks that thought of breaking, and thinks it through
the ve r y interwovenness of thought and mind with world and time:

The landscape and the language are the same .
And we ourselves are language and are land,
together grew with Sheepfold Hill , rock, and hand,
and mind, all taking substance in a thought
wrought out of mystery : birdflight air
predestined from the first to be a pair :
as in the atom, the living rhyme
invented her divisions , which in time ,
and in the terms of time , would make and break
the text, the texture , and then all remake .
This powerful mind that can by thinking take
the order of the world and all remake ,
will it , for joy in breaking, break ins tead
its own deep thought that thought itself be dead?
I am going to read the last bit again.

This powerful mind that can by thinking take
the order of the world and all remake
will it , for joy in breaking, break instead
its own deep thought that thought itself be dead?

(1 ; 913)

That thought--the power of thinking that can all remake--brings me back to
the observation from Einstein in the introduction to these remarks: that when
we split the atom everything changed--except our ways of thinking.
In that observation, he puts his finger on what is at the root of all this
talk a bout t i me--a feeling, a strong sense that things are changing. Or maybe,
a nd thi s i s a deeper intuition, that everything did change in some ultimate way
11

at some moment when we had our backs turned--except us, who were left behind in
the dust. Here (Iris ') conversation echoes back through these adult reflections
--the gods have left, time has run out, and it's up to us, the people now, to
change our thinking; or, as she says, "for the People to not want war."
Now, that's an interesting way to put it, to place the emphasis on wanting-that is, on desire, or if I might put it in these terms, to direct our attention
to preference and valuing rather than to action or to a problem-solving intelligence. And, indeed, it can be persuasively argued that we have used our talents
for action and invention to their utmost limits--and perhaps beyond. Who could
not be dazzled by our "great inventions?" Something in this thought seemed
headed in the right direction. It seemed useful at least to ask how thinking
can include valuing, not as a system of codified values nor as vague sentiments,
but as a positive and active force. It has occurred to me as I have grown older
that wishes all too often do come true--not necessarily in the ways expected,
but nonetheless recognizably. That observation made me wonder about the seemingly negative .solution offered by Past: maybe to not want war passionately
enough, to actively not prefer it, is not as futile as it might, at first
glance, appear. It would certainly lead one, in any event, to look very hard at
the something one didn't prefer, the something that one abhorred.
As I was pondering these thoughts, it happened that another set of circumstances led me to re-read Howard Nemerov's three lectures, titled "What Was
11odern Poetry?" It had not been lost on me in previous readings of these
remarkable essays that the burden of the thought is addressed to Change, and
particularly the one Nemerov refers to as the Great Change. The change referred
to by this phrase is the Scientific Revolution wrought by Galileo's enormous
imaginative leap and consolidated by the mighty company of thinkers--Kepler,
Giordano Bruno, Newton--who refashioned our view of the physical universe and by
this changed interpre tation laid the foundation for the "great inventions"--and
for other changes. In the essay, other big changes--the departure of legend and
myth as active forces in thought, the Renaissance, and the Great War--are each
discussed with the aid of some singularly beautiful poems in the light of the
Great Change and in order to understand their implications for poetry and the
writing of it.
Now the influences that affect the writing of poetry in our times may not
appear to be altogether earthshaking for those of us who don't write it, and
who, if we read it, may not altogether trust our grasp of the poems--let alone
the intellectual and critical pyro-technics that flare in their wake. But for
several reasons I found Nemerov 's reflections on change coalescing inwardly with
my thoughts on (Iris') conversation, on Aiken's poem, and with acute specificity
on Einstein 's implied exhortation : that if everything has changed then we must
change, too--and change by changing our thinking: not what we think about but
the very ways we do it. What leapt out at me in this re-reading of the essays
was not the impeccable and balanced description of the alterations in human
experience gradually felt as alterations of world view as the Scientific Revolution took its historical place in consciousness; nor was it the brilliant and
moving account of the utter discontinuity of Western experience rendered by the
cataclysm of the Great War. This time, with other thoughts of change of mind,
it was a statement that for Nemerov is rather dry and abstract, that caught my
attention : it is this,

12
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The Great Change is not historical only, but primarily metaphysical
and psychological ; something we have a certain experience of under
today ' s historical conditions , and yesterday ' s , but also something
we should have experienced, though in other terms perhaps , whenever
and wherever we lived, a change that can become historical, in fact ,
only becaus e it is fir s t the experience o f every individual at all
times . ( 6; 190, emphasis mine)
The phra sing, dry in a bstract i on from the context, was filled with sign i ficance as I read it following a s it did from a sensiti ve r ender i ng of Richard
Wi lbur's poem, "Merlin Enthralled," in which, as Merlin i s lulled into a last
sleep, the enchantments f ade, the world changes, and Arthur's legendary strength
fades. Nemerov descri bes i t thus:

And as he (Merlin) ceased from dreaming into deeper and simple sleep,
we are to understand, a certain great reality departed from the world
because he no longer had the world in mind. The poem ends with
Arthur ' s being made al.tXlre that this is so , though not of why it is
so .
Here, Nemerov quotes the final e i gh t lines:

Fate would be fated ; dreams desire to sleep.
This the forsaken will not understand .
Arthur upon the road began to weep
And said to Gawen Remember when this hand
Once haled a sword from stone ; now no less strong
It cannot dream of such a thing to do .
Their mail grew quainter as they clopped along .
The sky became a still and woven blue . (6 ; 189)
I am going to take the time to read Nemerov's interpretation of this loss,
this change, but before I do I want to add to the setting of Wi lbur's poem in
legend, the setting of Aiken's poem in landscape and rhyme, the setting of
( Iris') conversat i on i n voi ce and time, and the setting of Ei nste i n's obse rva tion in the splitting atom; all these were present in my mi nd as I read these
lines:

In Wilbur ' s poem the magic that Merlin did is seen to be ima.gination,
relating to will , to dream, to spirit, with their incredible power of
overcoming the visible and natural world as it were by poetizing it
full of spirits . When Merlin fades from the world, the supernatural
entities fade also, leaving bewilderment behind . For these supernatural entities ma.y be easily derided and mocked into nonexistence
by the s keptical under their traditional names , such names as
Jehovah , Lucifer, Michael , Ahriman and so on ; but at some peril to
all of us, for if those names are fictitious names , and they are ,
they nevertheless name perfectly real forces able to produce perfectly real and spectacular results in what we call the real world .
The names presently given to such beings --mind, spirit, will , soul,
ima.gination, intellectual light--are also under the attack of a
skeptical reasoning power minded to daylight alone and entire ;
(6 ; 190)
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What I want t o underscore here is the bold assertion that thought conceived
to include mind, spirit, will, soul, imagination, and intellectual light can have
effects--"real and spectacular results in what we call the real world . " Bold,
because we have routed our powers. Steeped in a climate of skepticism, we have
grown accustomed to the reduction of thought to cognition, memory to recall,
feeling to affect, will to motivation, imagination to inventiveness, and aspiration to ambition.
While a reduced v1s1on would have it so, I share Nemerov's belief in the
force and efficacy of thought, and the powers of mind that are ours to reclaim;
just as I believe that (Iris') intuition that "to not want war" can be a step
toward that reclamation of the power of mind that "can by thinking take/the
order of the world and all remake." Indeed, that is what Einstein did do--and
not, I note, by invention--but by a leap of imagination. To all remake by
thought. That is power indeed, and Nemerov quoting another man of letters,
Erich Heller, cautions us thus about the use of such power: "Be careful how
you interpret the world; it is that way." (5 ; 205)
Having got this far in my musings, I found I had no trouble going along
with this general line of thought. In fact, many other thinkers who put forward
views very close to these began to crowd to mind; some like Nemerov and Aiken
are poets or artists, but others are philosophers, sc i entists and mathematicians
(Whitehead, Eddington, Lewis Thomas).
Back to Einstein. How then, if this is our dilemma, do we change thinking
--our ways of doing it? How do we, in response to the changes wrought by the
"great inventions," themselves the product of our minds, re-think mind? Clearly,
there are risks in this undertaking. If I were to rephrase Erich Heller's warning, it might be to add this, "Be careful how you interpret mind. It is that
way." According to this reasoning, if we conceive mind, and believe itto be,
a calculator or computer, in short, a machine, it will be, effectively, that--a
self-fulfilling model of the machines it originated. And there is plenty of
evidence that we have traveled a long way toward confirming this picture of mind
and thought--and that it is effectively coloring our views of ourselves. Indeed,
I would hold that this self-fulfillment is instrumental in the reduction Nemerov
calls to our attention which renders memory to be synonymous with a data bank
and intellect or thinking to be synonyms for logical anaylsis and problemsolving. But this is happily only the case with important qualifications--else
there would be no Nemerov or Aiken or Wilbur writing poetry and calling our
attention to the light of intellect and the power of thought that can all things
remake, including thought itself. And even more importantly, there would be no
vocabulary or thought for a ten year old (Iris) to draw upon to call our attention to the starting point of these ruminations--to the power of preference and
value: "for the People to not want war."
Let it suffice to say that something in us does not accept the limitations
that we ourselves seek to impose on our own powers. There is, it seems to me,
always a saving grace--a muchness of thought that breaks through whatever boundaries it sets upon itself. And it may be, that in the re-thinking of thinking,
that this surplus, this vague intuition of moreness is as good a. place to start
that process as any. The more so, because it brings us face to face with a
habit of mind that reduces the world by dividing it cleanly into opposites . It
is the habit aptly identified by Paul Fussell as gross dichotomizing, a dichotomizing that obliterates the gray areas, the ambiguities, that is the enemy, to

borrow a phrase from G. M. Hopkins, of all things "pied and dappled." Fussell
attri butes that potency of dichotomies in our perceptions and thoughts to the
Great War.

What we can call gross dichotomizing is a persisting imaginative
habit of modePn times , tpaceable , it wou ld seem, to the actualitie s
of the Great War . "We " are all here on this side ; "the enemy" i s
over there . "We " are individuals with name s and personal identities ; "he " is a mere collective entity . We are visible ; he i s
invisible . We are normal ; he is grotesque ... (4; ?5)
Fussell continues to this i mplication,

The physical confrontation between "us " and "them " is an obvious
figure of gross dichotomy . But less predictably the mode of gross
dichotomy came to dominate perception and expres sion elsewhere ,
encouraging finally what we can call the modePn versus habit : one
thing opposed to another, not with some Hegelian hope of synthesis
involving a dissolution of both extremes (that would suggest "a
negotiated peace ," which is anathema) , but with a sense that one
of the poles embodies so wicked a de f iciency or flaw or perversion
that its total submission is called for . (4 ; ?9)
Surely, this destroying thought is one worth re-thinking--the thought of
some utterly other, not human as we are, but a stranger to the human affections
and woes that we so unques t ioningly assume to be the condition of our own lives.
And, let th i s one habit be recognized for all it carries in its train: racism,
isolationism, apartheid, classism, civil war, holy wars, and, indeed, every act
and thought that is guided by a single vision, that over clarifies, that chooses
affirmation of its own existence and influence by the path of destruction and
obliteration.
That singleness of outlook l urks in every action and thought that says in
whatever terms, you are not and may not be in order that I and mine may flourish;
that is, i n every action a nd thought which denies that common earthbound ground
of our humanity wh i ch dictates that for each of us without exception there is a
personal world. A personal world--that i s, a world woven of desire and aspiration, articulated in vivid moments, variegated by accomplishment, punctuated by
loss, muted by gri ef, a nd oriented ever and always by the lodestar of relationsh i ps with others--those others exper i enced i ntimately and those remote in time
and spa ce, whose stories a nd li ves, by virtue of the light they may shed, are
blended textuall y and texturally with our own. In short, a common ground,
within whi ch d i f f erences among us i nv ite an a dventure of the mi nd and spirit,
i n which nuance spices and complements, and in which the wholl y unfamiliar, the
strange, demands of us the open-ness, the trust, and active eff ort to embrace
it that is the c r own of our ima gi nat i on and our only claim to freedom.
But break i ng a ha bi t is not achieved by bare decision--nor even by recogniz i ng and acknowledging its evi l ef fects upon us. Habits serve us well and
fulf i ll very real needs, the more so as they offer--or appear to offer--an
element of certainty in an uncertain world. As Owen Barfield observes, " ... habit
has a will of its own ... (and) just willing yourself to get rid of it by behaving
di fferently will not work." ( 2; 75-76) He suggests that "the only effective
way i s deliberately to form a new habit at variance with the old one." (2; 75)
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I choose to emphasize for my purposes the words "at variance with"; that is, not
"in opposition to." To break the habit of dividing the world into opposing
forces, let us actively think, effortfully think its complimentary thought: the
world and humanity in its manifold multiplicity, a unity that everywhere and
through all t i me showers us with the wonders of its novelty, its variations, its
diverse effects. Let us reclaim that wonder, that richness of diverse expressiveness that is human-ness, that thought "that can all remake," in full
consciousness of its cumulative power--not only its dividing power.
III

An act of reclamation. An act of imagination. An act of memory. Let us
consider our task to be the re-making of mind to gather within it its many categories, its many visions. Let us qualify the partial vision of mind and humanity
as ascending or progressing, progressing upward in steady steps or cubits, with
a complementary vision of width and reach--an encompassing whole. Let us consider change n·ot as measured intervals only but as blends and variations and
also immeasureable leaps. What changes has its own slowness and constancy and
also its soaring moments, in which, at the moment--between blinks of the eye as
it were--all is transformed and shines in a new light. The transforming leap--a
leap-like Ga lileo's or Einstein's--occurs as it does and when it does and not
from des i gn. But however mysteriously, the leap is from the ground, a prepared
ground, and not from out of the blue.
And now I reach to the heart of it, the i nnermost place to which (Iris')
conversation led me: "for the People to not want war" ... for the People to change
... for the People to extend beyond their cleverness and inventiveness ... for the
People to become consc i ous of their preferences; or rather, of the choice and
power inherent in wanting, in preferring.
Here my thoughts turn to Whitehead and his understanding that the original
and fundamental da tum of human experience, universally experienced, is not fact,
or sensation, or thing, or concept, but a value-experience, a sense of worth or
enjoyment. He says in this respect,

Our enjoyment of actuality is a value - experience . It s basic expres sion is --Have a care , here is something that matt ers ! Yes -- that is
the best phrase -- the primary glimmering of consciousnes s r eveals ,
Something that matters ... Instead of fixing attention on the bodily
digestion of vegetable food , it .catches the gleam of the sunlight as
it fal l s on the foliage . It nurtures poetry . Men are the children
of the Universe , with foolish enterprises and irrational hope s. A
tree sticks to its business of mere survival ; as does an oyster with
some minor divergencies . In this way , t he lifeaim at survival is
modified into the human aim at survival for diversified worth- while
experience . (8 ; 159 , 42 - 43)
By this inversion, which places worth or importance at the base of human
experience rather than sensation or object properties, Whitehead points to the
impulse to value as that which extends us beyond ourselves and underlies our
predisposition for a communal mode of life. My pain is my own as are my digestive processes. But my experience of worth, what catches my eye, what arouses
caring, sympathy and attention calls me into a world which is peculiarly human.
Human in that it is shaped by aspirations, and ideals, and is not then merely
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subject to the laws of cause and effect but, to its peril and its glory, lends
itself to purposes, convictions, and passionate beliefs.
This inversion, then, has far reaching implications for what it means to
be human, to be a subject interpreting and affecting events. Objectivity is
concentration on the "facts" to the exclusion of their evocative value. Science
seeks causes in the physical realm and strives for understanding of large average
effects. In the human world, the subjective or personal element is the unity of
the world through which value, importance and purpose is understood. These are
the binding elements. Every "fact" has here to be grasped as a process amidst
processes. We, as humans, contribute history and religious impulse to the world
factors. We do that. There is no history, little novelty and no unity of
ideals without us.
I think, going a little further with this, that it may be fair to say that
purpose is to history as cause is to science. Purposes are large and visible
through enactment in the actuality of the world. Unlike private motives or
intentions, which I understand to give emphasis to the individuality of experience and thought, purpose is shareable, communal and social.
Thus, purposes inspired by ideals and values, unite people in common efforts
and are beacons that shine across generations and epochs. Moses' purpose to lead
the Children of Israel out of Egypt was not merely a private intention, personally motivated, it was a social act that united a people; this can also be said
of Martin Luther King or Gandhi. That, of course, doesn't mean that purposes
are "good" or their outcomes predictable. Nevertheless, purposes, unlike
motives, always extend beyond themselves. They aim at effects on a larger
social context, whether that context is political, religious, or artistic.
Another way to say this is to say that purposes have value-intensity. It
is, it seems to me, the essence of human-ness that we are teleological: aiming
at ideals, aspiring to be what we are not, and so tragic and also comic. We are
never what we might be and yet always more than what we are taken to be in any
account that reduces us to our behaviors or our motives. As I see it, we are
always value-embodied, and never more so than when we deny to value its existence
and efficacy. According to this line of thought, the acme and heart of subjectivity is a refined, attuned and differentiated apprehension of value, purposes
and ideals, especially as these are made available through human "works." In
the sense in which I am using this term "works" are large, social, and common to
all phases and conditions of life.
As I understand it, the shareableness of "works" among us--Einstein's,
Aiken's, Nemerov's or (Iris')--our understanding of them and the joy and edification they bring is only possible through the broadly human impulse to seek
worth and novelty. By your works, I participate in your vision, not because it
is my own, but because I have also a vision, aslant of yours, but comparable to
it in this: I, like you, strive to make sense and meaning of experience and so
to achieve a degree of certainty, permanence, and control with respect to the
rush and flow of events, and of equal importance, to add to those events as
given, a shape and an interpretation that is peculiarly my own by impressing my
value-imprint upon them. It is thus that we enhance, qualify and enlarge each
other--and actuality itself.
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And so to a conclusion : that the impulse to value, to prefer, to seek
worth is educable and so capable of change . That is, because we are capable of
valuing, we are able, and more than that, impelled to go beyond the immediacies
of our sense expe r iences and mere survival to seek, as Whitehead suggests, a
diversified worth-while experience . In other words , the anatomy of valuing
reveals an essentially outward impulse that opens us to the world, both in what
it arouses and what it sets in motion . My point is this: whatever the particular that evokes it, that something calls us from beyond ourselves and simultaneously points beyond itself. Something shines through the event and awakens the
spirit, the imagination of the viewer--be it the play of sunlight on the leaves,
or a bridge spanning in one courageous arc a mi ghty river, or the harmonic intricacies of a fugue .
Most fundamentally then, valuing is a boundary-breaker, offering a connection with something wider than ourselves and enlarging~ ourselves. In childhood, the impulse to value is emblemized by wonder, in youth by aspiration, and
in adulthood by the sense of high purpose . When wonder, aspiration or purposes
release us and set us in motion, we are called to seek and to search. Whether
that seeking entails physical action or an inward journey of thought, it is an
adventure of the human mind in its pursuit of the coherence, meaning and unity
of experience. Thus, through its expression in wonder, aspiration and purpose,
valuing leads us to create order, to make sense of experience, and, in effect,
to create a humanly habitable world.
In the education of the affections and impulse to value, it is no small
thing then to know what arouses the child's wonder, the youth's aspirations or
the adult's sense of purpose for these are trustworthy guides to preference, to
what is cared for and what arouses devotion. And, where caring is, there is
also--and not incidentally--the impulse to make, to build, to create "works,"
to contribute. These thoughts begin to define the educational task.
But there is another side. Valuing because it breaks boundaries and leads
beyond ourselves also leaves us peculiarly vulnerable to influences--and so, as
noted, educable. But it means, too, that we are open to unhospi t able influences
or destructive ones . For example, wonder can be titillated or d i verted by sheer
novelty or sated and dulled by "entertainment." Similarly, aspiration can be
blocked from expression, leading on the one hand to self-paralys i s and depression
or on the other, to a restlessness that seeks an outlet in excitement, speed and
thrill-seeking of all kinds . In the same vein, a sense of high purpose which
finds no avenues for fulfillment can be reduced to a narrowly-defined self
interest which finds expression in a fiercely competitive spirit or in a craving
for fame . These thoughts, too, point to dimensions of the educational task; not
least of all, it raises the question of what would be demanded of a society which
genuinely sought and made room for the contributions of all its members .
It is interesting to note in this respect Whitehead's observation that ''The
vigour of civilized societies is preserved by the widespread sense that high
aims are worthwhile . " (7; 288) He then goes on to characterize a vigorous
society as possessing a "certain extravagance of objectives;" (7; 288) or,
phrased another way, an abundance of possibilities. In a time like ours , when
scarcity and the shortage of possibilities are bywords of the society, this
observation deserves more than passing attention.
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However, what I need to underscore here is that while the kind of education
that would address valuing may not be consonant with dominant interests abroad
in our society, it is undertakeable and doable. In fact, there are many classrooms here in Philadelphia in which, in spite of almost overwhelming obstacles,
teaching responsive to children as bearers of value is a reality. It must, of
course, also be acknowledged that, while do-able, such an education is subtle in
that it requires a close attentiveness to the child's preferences and aversions
as these are visible in wonder and play; to the young person's aspirations and
dreams as these are visible in hopes and fears of the future, in friendships and
memberships, and in projects freely chosen and conceived; and to the adult's
commitments and purposes as these are reflected in vocation, relationships and
works .
In another context*, I have sketched the requirements for conducting such
an education and posed questions as guides to its implementation . In that
sketch I address education to valuing, meaning, choice, purpose and commitment,
and caring and affection. I entertain its outcomes according to a wholeness and
unity in knowledge--but a unity that is inclusive of the mainfold of its diverse
expressions and of a subjective experience on the part of the learner. In that
experience, discernment, taste, appreciation and discipline are emphasized . As
noted in the summary of requirements of such a plan, time is a constant and a
major consideration:
For example, to let valuing occur requires time and the possibility
for wonder, recognition and mystery and the opportunity to explore
meaning;
To let meaning occur requires time and possibility for the rich
and varied relationships among things to become evident, and for
difference to be understood in the light of that relatedness;
To let choice occur requires time and the possibility for discernment, taste, and perspective to occur;
To sustain purpose and commitment requires time and the possibility for discipline to occur;
To facilitate caring and affection requires time and the possibility for appreciation to occur.
To implement this education requires a focus on the person as a valuer, and
as a valuer in the world context of things and people. To focus attention in
that direction, I would propose as a starting point that we might raise to ourselves as parents and teachers questions of the following order:
- How does this child make his or her presence felt and how does
gesture express the child's meaning and feelings?

* Documentation of the 13th Summer Institutes: (Chapter I) "Values in
Education & the Child's Impulse to Value"; Patricia F. Carini; The Prospect
Center: 1983.
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- How is this child disposed toward the world and other people?
What does the child care about deeply and how is that caring
expressed? What arouses anger, coldness, embarrassment, hurt?
- What situations and circumstances evoke the child's will and
allow the child to exercise discipline and care--or, conversely,
interrupt the child's energy and will?
- What stories, ideas, and events are remembered, savored, and
enacted by the child? What larger "world imagery" is referred
to in these memories and enacted in play, writing or drawing?
The specif i c questions are illustrative, and most likely, others more powerful in their implications can be conceived. However, speaking more broadly now,
an education conceived along these lines emphasizes reflection rather than
acquisition; ev.ocation, rather than mastery over; purpose and aspiration rather
than achievement of narrowly-defined goals; and contribution and productivity
rather than excellence. I feel these emphases are important to stress because
they have been neglected; they are not, however, to be construed as oppositional
to, or a dismissal of, such educational aims as achievement or mastery. By this
emphasis, I and other like-minded educators, seek to restore a rightful balance
between intellect and spirit.
The aim here is to educate persons to be contributors to society and culture
and to be, in Whitehead's term "impressers of value"--in order that we shall not
ourselves fall victims to the excesses of our own mental powers: As Edith Cobb
points out,

More than anything else , love of nature and love of the child have
taught humankind to cultivate mind as well as the garden , to dome s ticate landscape as well as home and per sonality . But thi s thinking
belongs to simpler biocultural levels than are allowed f or in the
present hypnotic attraction f or mechanized motion and the conque s t
of nature . As the envi ronment crumbles and steel and conc1,ete take
the place o f earth, the spirit may crumble as well . Without the
element o f spirit, man become s sheer animal while retaining the
cunning of intellect . (3 ; 74 )
Here, I find myself returning for a last time to (Iris') conversation. It
was the word "want" in the phrase "to not want war" that directed attention to a
re-thinking of thought that would restore the sharp dualities and clean cleavages
achieved with such elegance by a problem solving intelligence to the embracing
wholeness of mind; a mind inclusive of spirit, memory, will and imagination--and
most especially, of that impu lse to value which leads us to seek worth and meaning in experience. That re-thinking led us on to a consideration of the broad
outlines of an education that would address itself to value, through attention
to wonder, aspiration, and purpose. These re-thinkings would seem to open up
productive avenues for further discussion.
Nevertheless, I cannot conclude these remarks without one more glance at
that deep thought: "for the People to not want war." This, too, points a
direction. I believe with the deepest conviction that as much as we must oppose
ourselves, politically and morally and with unwavering vigilance, to the waging
of war, we must also practice the austere discipline to not want it . That may
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seem easy, since we may be inclined to say that to want war is unthinkable, and
in a certain sense it is. But to construe the world and its manifold potentials
according to a single vision and grossly dichotomous oppositions has to my mind
certainly proved itself all too thinkable. And, surely, this habit of thought
is more than tangentially related to a war-like, combative posture. As an aside,
I would only ask what else is being thought when there is a proclamation of a
"war to end wars," or an exhortation "to fight for peace," or when a phrase like
"ours is a litigious society," is, even though altogether unpronounceable, a
rather common-place phrase? So discipline is needed: to not want war. To break
that habit, I have suggested that we must with equal vigor, and by affirmation of
faith in ourselves as capable of thought, re-think our human-ness according to
its fullest potential. For herein I believe lies the hope of the people: to
take full responsibility for the development of a mind which by unifying the
light of intellect with spirit, memory, will, imagination, and feeling, can all
remake.
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